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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on 
boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a 
large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in 
loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are 
associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during 
the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank-
firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, 
suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.  
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Banks are the most important source of external finance for corporations around the world. Even 
if we count only syndicated loans, firms borrow more money from banks than they raise through 
public debt and equity issuance together.1 Recurring loan transactions imply that banks 
accumulate non-transferable information through their relationships with firms. They benefit 
from accessing and producing information on borrowers by exploiting economies of scale and 
scope. Bank-firm relationships extend beyond repeated lending interactions, as universal banks 
offer other financial services, underwrite and trade securities, and manage investment funds. This 
is most common in continental Europe, although recent industry consolidation has eroded the 
separation of commercial and investment banking in the United States as well.    
We examine how bank involvement in corporate governance affects a firm’s choice of lead 
arranger bank and loan supply, as well as pricing in the syndicated market. We use a large 
sample of syndicated loans to publicly listed non-financial firms over the 2003-2008 period to 
study the lending and governance relationships between banks and firms. The sample covers 
firms and banks in 42 countries. We collect information on two types of governance links 
between lead arranger banks and borrower firms: (1) whether a bank executive sits on a firm’s 
board of directors; and (2) whether fund management companies affiliated with the same 
financial group as the lead arranger bank have equity holdings in the firm.  
These bank-firm governance links capture a dimension of how dependent a firm is on its 
lender that has been largely overlooked in the literature. Kroszner and Strahan (2001a) find that 
over 30% of the largest U.S. firms have bankers on their boards of directors. The percentages are 
even higher in Japan and Germany (Kaplan and Minton 1994; and Dittman, Maug, and 
Schneider 2010). Although historically banks have held concentrated positions in some firms (La 
                                                            
1 Drucker and Puri (2006) report that U.S. industrial firms borrowed $13.2 trillion in the 1993-2003 period via 
syndicated loans, whereas they issued $10.2 trillion of public debt and $2.3 trillion of common stock. 
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Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; and Berlin 2000), these bank direct equity holdings 
are no longer as common. Institutional holdings, however, represent a growing channel of bank 
influence over firm governance. Almost all universal banking groups across most countries have 
developed large asset management divisions in recent years, offering mutual funds and other 
investment vehicles. These funds can invest in the same publicly listed firms to which banks 
make loans. 
Our hypothesis is that a bank connected with a borrower firm (through a board seat or an 
institutional holding) has an information advantage over other banks. Even if the bank has no 
direct cash flow rights, as in the case of institutional holdings, or holds just control rights, as in 
the case of board representation, the bank-firm link may improve information flows between the 
bank and the firm through screening (Allen 1990) and monitoring (Diamond 1984).2 A borrower 
firm under such influence may be inclined to reveal more information than it might in a straight 
transaction-oriented relation with another lender, and the bank itself has stronger incentives to 
invest in producing information (Boot 2000). Banks providing arm’s-length finance would thus 
be at a disadvantage. Our hypothesis predicts that bank-firm governance links lead to more 
lending and lower interest rate spreads charged by linked banks than by similar non-linked 
banks.  
An alternative hypothesis is that banks can use their board seats or equity stakes in a firm to 
promote their interests as creditors by directing more business toward themselves and arranging 
more favorable loan terms. The bank’s position as an insider may allow it to extract rents from 
its information monopoly and potentially to hold-up a firm due to information asymmetries 
between other lenders and the firm (Sharpe 1990; and Rajan 1992). Banks can pressure firms to 
                                                            
2 An additional channel is that bank equity stakes can reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and costs of 
financial distress (Berlin, John, and Saunders 1996). 
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take a loan at uncompetitive interest rates, and then make it difficult for them to access 
alternative credit as the connected bank has information that a new lender does not.  
These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive as we could see different effects of bank-
firm governance links over time depending on credit market conditions—intertemporal 
smoothing of loan interest rates. We posit that linked banks charge lower interest rate spreads 
during financial crises but then higher spreads when economic conditions are favorable.3 
Furthermore, bank-firm governance links are likely to affect credit supply during financial crises. 
We posit that linked borrowers are less affected by credit rationing than non-linked borrowers 
during financial crises when banks face capital constraints.4 
Allen and Gale (1995, 1997) highlight the benefits of long-term relationship banking 
systems in intertemporal smoothing of loan interest rates. They cite universal banks in Germany 
as an example of a relationship banking system, where banks have long-term ties to borrower 
firms, with a direct role in their governance. Research supports the notion that banks smooth loan 
rates to (small business) borrowers in response to changes in aggregate credit conditions 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; and Berlin and Mester 1998, 1999).5  
We first examine whether a bank-firm governance link makes it more likely that the bank 
will be chosen as a lead arranger for future loans. To conduct this test, we pair firms with each of 
the top 20 banks in a country (in terms of syndicated loans activity regardless of a bank’s 
nationality) and estimate a logit model. The results indicate that firms tend to obtain more loans 
                                                            
3 An alternative hypothesis is that rent extraction may be exacerbated during a financial crisis when firms are locked 
in to their lenders. Santos and Winton (2008) find that banks charge higher loan spreads during recessions to firms 
that are more bank-dependent, which they define as those firms with no access to public bond markets. In the case of 
bank-firm governance links, it is more likely that the bank supports the firm during financial crises. 
4 Previous studies find evidence of credit rationing during financial crises (De Haas and Van Horen 2011; Puri, 
Rocholl, and Steffen 2011; and Schnabl 2011) but prior relationships seem to mitigate these supply-side effects. 
5 Another possibility is that banks with control over firms can provide liquidity insurance to borrowers during 
periods of financial distress; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) provide some evidence on this in Japan. 
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from banks to which they have governance links. Banks represented on a firm’s board of 
directors are 21.8% more likely to be picked as lead arrangers than banks with no such 
representation (the probability increases from 15.7% to 37.4%). If the bank has affiliated 
institutional holdings in borrower firms, the probability increases by 9.2%. 
We next analyze whether bank-firm governance links affect credit supply. We are interested 
in whether borrowers who have a prior governance link with the bank are more likely to receive 
a loan during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We find a clear benefit to bank-firm governance 
links. While banks significantly reduce their loan activity during the financial crisis, we find that 
borrowers with governance links to the banks are less likely to suffer a drop in lending during the 
financial crisis. These effects are economically sizable. The decline in loan activity is lower by 
about 6% for linked borrowers than non-linked borrowers, and the probability of a stop in 
lending is lower by about 10%. Our evidence suggests that bank-firm governance links are 
important in mitigating credit rationing effects in times of financial crises.  
We then examine whether a bank-firm governance link affects the loan terms. We find that 
banks with board seats or with institutional holdings in the borrower firm charged significantly 
higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom than they charged to borrowers with no 
such link. The presence of a banker on a board of directors is associated with a higher loan 
spread of about 7 basis points (bps) over spreads for borrowers with no such link. In the case of 
an institutional holding link, the loan spread was higher by 15 bps over loans with no such link. 
These effects are economically significant, as they represent 6% and 12% of the average loan 
spread. Moreover, we do not find evidence that higher spreads are the result of relaxing non-
pricing contract terms, such as collateral, covenants, or maturity.  
We investigate the intertemporal smoothing of loan interest rates using the 2007-2008 
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financial crisis period when there was a spike in bank loan spreads (Brunnermeier 2010; Ivashina 
and Scharfstein 2010; and Santos 2011). We find that bank-firm board links are associated with 
significantly lower loan spreads during the financial crisis period. The presence of a banker on 
the borrower’s board of directors is associated with a lower loan spread of about 13 bps than for 
borrowers with no such link. In the case of an institutional holding link, borrowers with a link 
still pay higher spreads by 8 bps than borrowers with no such link during the crisis, although this 
difference is lower than during the credit boom. 
Overall, our findings show the costs and benefits to the involvement of banks in firm 
governance. We find intertemporal smoothing of loan interest rate spreads: Banks that have 
board links to firms charge higher spreads to linked firms during the credit boom period but 
lower spreads during the financial crisis. The interpretation is that bank-firm board links seem to 
be valuable when credit shocks hit. In the case of institutional holding links, the evidence 
suggests that the benefit of the link mainly accrues to the bank. Thus, the eagerness to help the 
firm at the time of a financial crisis is likely to be stronger in the case of board links than in the 
case of institutional holdings links as the former gives the bank additional access to information 
and influence through the boardroom. We also find that the intertemporal smoothing of loan 
spreads is more important in relationship-based lending than in transaction-based lending. 
Another important concern with our findings is endogeneity of the presence of a bank as 
board member or as an institutional equity holder. It may be the case that banks tend to have 
governance links to poorer quality firms that face higher borrowing costs to start with. 
Additionally, a bank’s presence as a board member or equity holder could arise endogenously in 
response to governance issues (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010). This may explain why 
firms tend to obtain more loans from banks to which they have governance link and why the 
6
bank presence is associated with higher spreads in a healthy economic climate.  
We address endogeneity concerns in several ways. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
firm (and bank) fixed effects. The firm fixed effects specification controls for unobserved 
sources of firm heterogeneity and solves problems in which an unobserved time-invariant 
variable simultaneously determines both the loan spread and the bank-firm link. The other 
approach is instrumental variable estimation methods, where the first stage models the presence 
of the bank-firm link. We use two instruments: banking regulation restrictions on the mixing of 
banking and commerce in each country (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004) and whether the bank 
is publicly listed. We conclude that results are robust to this endogeneity bias correction. 
Our study contributes to the literature by examining the costs and benefits of access to bank 
loans around the world when banks are involved in firm governance through board 
representation and affiliated institutional holdings. The international dimension of our study 
recognizes that banks and firms operate internationally. It also allows us to explore the cross-
country variation in bank-firm governance links, and if the effect of these links is different 
between local banks vis-à-vis foreign banks.  
Evidence on the effects of the presence of bankers on the boards of non-financial firms in 
the U.S. is mixed. Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find that firms obtain more loans when 
bankers join the board of directors, but these loans are mostly to financially unconstrained firms. 
Kroszner and Strahan (2001b) find that bankers hold seats on boards of large and low-risk firms, 
and they do not find significant effects on loan pricing. Evidence from international studies is 
also mixed (Drucker and Puri 2006).6 
                                                            
6 In Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) find that banks use their equity holdings and board seats to improve firm 
performance. More recently Dittman, Maug, and Schneider (2010) find evidence that bank representation on the 
boards of non-financial firms is not in the best interest of firms.  
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Our research goes beyond previous studies that focus on a particular type of link or investor 
in the U.S. Santos and Wilson (2007) find that banks charge lower interest rate spreads on firms 
when they hold a voting stake through their trust business. We examine links via other bank-
affiliated institutional holdings (e.g., mutual funds), as well as board links. Jiang, Li, and Shao 
(2010) find lower interest rate spreads when an institutional investor simultaneously holds equity 
and debt claims of the same company. We look at lead arranger banks and their combined 
position through loans, as well as affiliated institutional holdings and board seats.    
1. Data 
This section describes the sample and data. Appendix A provides detailed definitions and the 
data sources for all variables in the tests.  
1.1 Sample of loans 
Data on syndicated bank loans are drawn from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan 
database. DealScan includes information on a variety of loan contract terms (amount, all-in 
drawn spread, maturity, structure, purpose, and type). Information on syndicated loans allows us 
to identify the lead arranger banks of each loan.  
Our initial sample covers all loans initiated from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2008. 
Syndicated loan deals include multiple tranches (or loan facilities) that differ in price, type, and 
maturity (such as a line of credit and a term loan). Following Qian and Strahan (2007), Santos 
(2010), and others, we perform our main tests at the facility level; that is, we treat the facilities in 
each deal as different loans.7 We exclude certain loan facilities from the sample: (1) loans in 
                                                            
7 There is no straightforward way to identify which facilities are part of a deal in DealScan. We assume that facilities 
make part of the same deal if (1) the borrower, (2) the deal date, (3) the primary purpose, and (4) the deal amount 
are all the same, and (5) the sum of the tranche amounts add up to the deal amount. We find similar results (not 
tabulated here) using only deals with a single facility or performing tests at the deal level. 
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which the borrower is a financial firm (SIC 6000-6999); (2) sovereign loans and loans in which 
the borrower is in the public sector (SIC 9000-9999); (3) deals with amounts below $100 million 
(amounts converted to U.S. dollars when they are in a different currency) for the sum of the 
tranches; and (4) loans without information on all-in drawn spread.  
We draw firm-level financial and market information for borrower firms from 
Datastream/Worldscope. We merge the loan item Borrower-Parent in DealScan with Datastream 
data using the firm’s country and ticker. If that information is unavailable, we perform a manual 
match by firm name. Only firms that we are able to identify as publicly listed in Datastream are 
included in the sample.  
To determine the most important banks worldwide, we use the top world banks list 
published by The Banker in 2005, which ranks the world’s leading commercial banks sorted by 
Tier 1 capital. For tractability, we restrict the sample to the top 500 banks. These banks are 
responsible for nearly 90% of the total number and volume of syndicated loans in DealScan in 
2003-2008. 
We focus on the lead arranger banks of each loan facility, which usually hold the largest 
share of the syndicated loans (see Kroszner and Strahan 2001a). The lead arranger is frequently 
the administrative agent, with a fiduciary duty to other syndicate members to provide timely 
information about the default of the borrower. Thus, the responsibilities of a lead bank best fit 
the description of a relationship lender. We treat loans granted by a parent bank and loans 
granted by a subsidiary or a branch of this bank as loans originating from the same lead arranger. 
For example, we classify loans arranged by bank branches like Santander Brasil and wholly 
owned subsidiaries like Abbey National as loans made by Banco Santander. In the case of 
facilities with several lead arrangers, we consider each facility separately for each lead arranger 
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(i.e., each facility times the number of arrangers).8  
In the regression tests, we control for several bank characteristics such as rank in The 
Banker’s list of top banks and nationality (according to bank headquarters) using bank country 
dummies. Bank characteristics come from the Bankscope database, namely, bank size and 
profitability. 
Our sample is biased towards large publicly listed firms in each country and market-oriented 
economies. Previous literature has shown that durable banking relationships create value even 
for large publicly traded firms (Lumier and McConnell 1989; and Houston and James 2001). 
“Relationship banking” is an important factor in the syndicated loan market (Bharath et al. 2007, 
2011) even in a market-oriented economy like the U.S. However, we believe that this sample 
bias works against finding intertemporal smoothing of loan interest rates, and we expect the 
effects to be even stronger in a sample of smaller and privately held firms or in bank-oriented 
economies.  
Table 1 summarizes our sample of loans by (borrower) country and bank. Panel A presents 
the number of loans, volume of loans, and number of firms by country. Our final sample includes 
1,885 publicly listed non-financial borrower firms in 42 countries (1,118 U.S. firms and 767 non-
U.S. firms), for a total of 17,181 loans and $4.6 trillion in loan volume over the 2003-2008 
period. There are 6,149 bank-firm pairs in the sample, of which 3,962 have at least two loans. Of 
the total number of loans, 14,862 were made during the credit boom period (2003 through the 
second quarter of 2007), and 2,319 during the crisis period (third quarter of 2007 through the end 
of 2008). Panel B presents similar information by bank for the top 30 ranked by volume of loans 
in 2003-2008. This list of top banks in the syndicated loan market includes some of the largest 
                                                            
8 Of a total of 1,232 different lead arrangers in syndicated loans during our sample period, 852 are affiliated with and 
matched to 237 of the top 500 banks. 
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banks in the world, such as Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and HSBC. The final sample includes a 
total of 102 banks. Table 2 presents summary statistics on loans, bank-firm, bank, and borrower 
firm variables. 
1.2 Bank-firm governance links 
We consider whether banks have governance links to borrower firms in terms of: (1) board seats 
and (2) institutional holdings through bank-affiliated money managers. We measure bank-firm 
links as of the end of the year prior to the loan initiation.  
We use the BoardEx database to find the board composition of publicly listed borrower 
firms and banks involved in the syndicated loan market. For each firm, BoardEx provides 
information on individual directors and network links of directors (i.e., all board positions an 
individual holds in other firms). We consider only first-degree network links between the list of 
banks and of firms. There is a bank-firm link when a bank executive is on the board of directors 
of a firm or when there is a board member common to the bank and the firm (at the end of the 
year before the loan initiation), except that we exclude instances where the common board 
member is an executive in the firm. The tests use a dummy variable (Board Link Dummy) for a 
board link, but we obtain consistent results when we use alternative variables such as the number 
of common board members between the bank and the firm or the sum of the number of years of 
tenure of common board members. These additional results are available in the Internet 
Appendix.9 
We use LionShares, the leading source for institutional equity holdings worldwide, to obtain 
data on institutional holdings in publicly listed borrower firms. Ferreira and Matos (2008) use 
this data set to study the role of institutional investors in corporations around the world. 
                                                            
9 An Internet Appendix for this article is online at http://www.sfsrfs.org/addenda.php. 
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Institutions are defined as professional money managers: mutual fund companies, pension funds, 
bank trusts, and insurance companies. 
Many of the banks involved in the syndicated loan market are part of universal banking 
groups that have asset management divisions that can invest in the same publicly listed 
companies to which the groups are lending. These divisions of banks are among the largest 
money management companies in the world. Of the top five money managers in the U.S., two 
are bank-affiliated (Barclays Global Investors and State Street Global Advisors), and three are 
stand-alone investment companies (Capital RM, Fidelity, and Vanguard). In France, all top five 
managers are affiliated with bank and insurance groups. In Germany, four of the top five are 
divisions of banks (Dresdner Bank Investment Management, DWS Investments, Deka 
Investments, and Union Investment), and one is independent (Universal Investment). We match 
the ultimate parent company of the institution to the list of top 500 banks (e.g., the ultimate 
parent for DWS Investments is Deutsche Bank). Thus, for each lead arranger bank, we identify 
the total institutional holdings of affiliated money managers in borrower firms in our sample.  
In our tests, we use a dummy variable (Institutional Holding Link Dummy) that takes the 
value of one if institutional money managers that are affiliated with the lead arranger bank have 
an equity holding of at least 1% of shares outstanding in the borrower at the end of the year 
before the loan initiation. We obtain consistent findings (see Internet Appendix) when we use 
alternative variables such as the percentage of shares held by affiliated institutions. 
A third type of governance link we control for is direct bank equity stakes. We also use 
LionShares to obtain insider ownership by banks in borrower firms.10 We manually match 
insider names with the top banks to measure insider equity ownership by the lead arranger bank 
                                                            
10 LionShares data sources are public investor filings with regulatory agencies around the world (like U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission forms 3, 4, and 144) and company annual reports. 
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in the borrower firm for each loan. In our tests, we include as a control variable a dummy 
variable (Insider Stake Link Dummy) that takes the value of one if the lead arranger bank has an 
equity holding of at least 1% of shares outstanding in the borrower.  
Panel A of Table 1 details bank-firm governance links by country. Of the 17,181 loans in 
our sample, 820 have a board link prior to the loan. Banks sit on the boards of 210 borrower 
firms of the 1,885 firms in our sample, meaning that 11% of the firms have at least one banker 
on the board of directors. Of the 17,181 loans in our sample, 1,672 had an institutional holding 
link prior to the loan. Bank groups have institutional holdings in 608 of the 1,885 borrower 
firms, meaning that more than 30% of the firms have at least one of the banks in our sample as 
an institutional holder. These two types of bank-firm governance links are thus quite frequent.  
Of the 17,181 loans in our sample, only 81 had a bank insider stake link before the loan was 
made (or 25 of the 1,885 borrower firms). This bank-firm governance link is quite rare because 
of structural changes in banking activities over the last decades in some of the traditionally bank-
dominated countries. For example, Dittman, Maug, and Schneider (2010) describe German 
banks’ divestment of their equity holdings in recent years, despite retaining board seats and large 
shareholdings of fund management divisions in the largest German firms.  
Panel B of Table 1 details bank-firm governance links for the 30 most active banks in the 
sample. The top banks have a considerable number of board connections. While often their asset 
management divisions have equity positions in the same firms to which the banks are lending, it 
is uncommon for banks to own equity directly. 
1.3 Examples of top banks 
In this section we provide some examples of bank-firm governance links for top banks operating 
in the syndicated loan market (see the Internet Appendix for more details). JPMorgan Chase was 
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the most active lead arranger bank during the sample period, with 2,186 loans or $961 billion. 
Board members from JPMorgan Chase held board seats in borrowers with a total of 138 loans in 
2003-2008, including Boeing, IBM, and Verizon. JPMorgan Chase arranged $11 billion in loans 
for IBM and Verizon, and $9 billion for Boeing.11 JPMorgan Asset Management (with a total of 
293 funds through divisions in the U.S., U.K., Hong Kong, and Singapore) held large equity 
stakes, with a total of 178 loans with linked firms. Interestingly, Boeing ($1.2 billion) is among 
the top holdings of JPMorgan asset management companies. 
One of the more interesting examples of a bank with multiple connections is Deutsche Bank. 
As the largest of the universal banks, Deutsche Bank was also one of the best connected entities 
in the German corporate network, with 47 positions on firms’ boards in our sample, including 
Siemens, Daimlerchrysler, Bayer, and Linde. In the case of Linde, Deutsche Bank arranged $5 
billion in loans in 2003-2008. Deutsche Bank’s asset management companies’ top equity 
holdings were in IBM ($1.3 billion) and Hewlett-Packard ($691 million) through DWS in 
Germany, and other Deutsche Bank asset management companies in the U.S., U.K., and other 
countries. Deutsche Bank acted as a lead arranger in loans of $8 billion to Hewlett-Packard and 
$6 billion to IBM (among top three borrowers of Deutsche Bank in 2003-2008). The fact that 
among the top borrowers and institutional holdings of Deutsche Bank are U.S. firms illustrates 
the importance of using an international sample for our study. 
Banks in other countries also offer interesting cases. Société Générale in France had links to 
firms for which it acted as lead arranger: loans of $8 billion to Vivendi (board link) and $4 
billion to Pernod Ricard (board link and equity holdings of $201 million). Bank-firm governance 
                                                            
11 JPMorgan had no equity stakes in publicly listed firms in our sample period as a result of the legacy of the Glass-
Steagall Act. Interestingly, however, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth 
century, JPMorgan’s financial services were not “arm’s-length,” as Morgan executives frequently sat on the boards 
of their corporate clients and firms raised funds only through the Morgan partnership (Ramirez 1995). 
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links, however, do not always translate into loans as in the case of Danone, which was the top 
institutional holding of Société Générale’s asset management companies.  
2. Do Bank-Firm Links Affect the Choice of Lead Arranger Bank?     
2.1 Main results 
We first test whether banks are more likely to arrange loans for firms when they play a role in 
the firm’s governance. The unit of analysis is a potential pairing between a company and a bank, 
where we need to consider both realized matches (bank i lends to firm j) and unrealized matches 
(bank i does not lend to firm j). For each borrower firm (j), we create a choice set of potential 
banks that might reasonably act as lead arranger for the loan. We want to economize on the size 
of the data set yet retain most of the loans. We thus choose the top 20 banks operating in each 
country, regardless the bank’s nationality, as ranked by volume of loans arranged for firms 
headquartered in that country; all firms have at least one syndicated loan arranged by a top-20 
bank operating in their country.12 There is substantial variation in nationalities among the top 20 
banks, with an average of nine different nationalities across countries. We then form 37,700 
bank-firm (i, j) pairs by combining i = 1, …, 20 (banks) with j = 1, …, 1,885 borrower firms.  
To test whether a bank-firm link impacts the choice of the lead arranger bank, we estimate a 
logit model: 
           Prob(Loan Dummy)i,j = a0 + a1(Bank-Firm Link)i,j +  a2Xi  + a3Yi,j  + εi,j,           (1) 
where the dependent variable, Loan Dummy, is a dummy variable that equals one if bank i acts 
as lead arranger in at least one loan to firm j over the 2003-2008 period, and zero otherwise. We 
                                                            
12 Bharath et al. (2007) also economize on the size of their data set by selecting the top 40 banks in the U.S., while 
Yasuda (2007) uses the top 15 banks in Japan. In our sample, the top 20 countries include local, regional, and global 
banks. For example, Banco Santander is number 1 in Spain, although it is not in the top 20 banks in France and the 
U.S. Société Générale, which is number 4 in Spain and number 3 in France, is also not ranked in the top 20 in the 
U.S. Citigroup, however, is number 3 in Spain, number 7 in France, and number 2 in the U.S.  
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use two alternative types of bank-firm governance link dummy variables: representation on the 
board of directors (Board Link Dummy), or the holding of shares through bank asset management 
divisions (Institutional Holding Link Dummy). We control for other bank-level (Xi) and firm-
bank level variables (Yi,j). All explanatory variables are measured as of the beginning of the 
sample period (December 2002). This procedure has the advantage of only using predetermined 
data as regressors, although the disadvantage of not updating bank-firm governance links for 
changes that take place after December 2002. 
Table 3 presents the results of the logit model for the lead arranger bank choice. The 
coefficients for a bank-firm board and institutional link are positive and significant in all 
specifications. The evidence is consistent with the idea that bank involvement in a firm’s 
governance increases the likelihood that the bank will provide a future loan. 
We first run specifications that include borrower firm industry dummies and dummies for 
the country of origin of the borrower firm and of the bank. We adjust t-statistics for clustering at 
the firm and bank level. Estimates in column (1) in Table 3 illustrate the economic significance 
of the bank-firm board link on the probability that a bank will provide future loans. The 
predicted probability that a bank is chosen as lead arranger if it does not have a board seat in the 
borrower firm is 15.7% (keeping all other variables at their means), while the predicted 
probability that it is chosen if it does have a board link is 37.4%. Thus, the probability that a 
bank will be chosen as a lead arranger increases by 21.8% if the bank has a board link with the 
borrower firm. Similarly, institutional holding links are associated with an increase of 9.2% in 
the probability that the bank will act as a lead arranger (using the estimates in column (3)). In 
column (5) we consider jointly the two bank-firm governance links, and find that the coefficients 
on the two links are positive and significant. We control for direct bank equity stakes in all 
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specifications. Although insider stake links are quite infrequent, they are also associated with an 
increase in the probability that the bank will act as lead arranger.  
The regressions control for other aspects of relationships between firms and banks observed 
in the literature. We construct a dummy variable (Past Loan Relationship Dummy) that takes the 
value of one if there is a syndicated loan between the lead arranger bank and the borrower firm in 
the five-year period prior to the beginning of our sample period (1998-2002). Past loans are 
positively associated with the likelihood that the bank will provide future loans to the same firm, 
which is consistent with the evidence in Bharath et al. (2007). We also control for the distance 
between the borrower and its potential lead arrangers by using a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the bank and firm are headquartered in the same geographic region (Same Region 
Dummy). We find evidence consistent with a home bias effect; i.e., borrowers tend to select local 
lead arranger banks. We also include a dummy variable for European banks to control for the 
special conditions of the European syndicated loan market (Carey and Nini 2007). We also 
control for bank characteristics such as rank in The Banker, size, and profitability.  
Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 3 show estimates of a conditional logit model that 
includes firm and bank fixed effects. The fixed effects control for interdependence in the bank-
firm pair observations between those for the same firm (whose decisions to borrow across banks 
are interdependent) and those for the same bank (whose lending decisions to different firms are 
also likely interdependent). The statistical and economic significance of the bank-firm 
governance links is barely affected. 
2.2 Robustness and endogeneity 
We check the robustness of our findings to alternative specifications and methods. The results 
are presented in Table 4. First, we address the issue that smaller countries have fewer relevant 
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banks operating and therefore some of the bank-firm pairs may not be truly representative. Our 
criteria based on the volume of loans in each country, regardless of bank nationality, minimizes 
this problem by including local and international banks among the top 20 banks.13 To check the 
robustness of our results, we implement several alternative bank-firm pair schemes. We first 
match each firm with the top 10 banks or top 5 banks (instead of the top 20 banks) operating in 
each country to address the concern that for small countries only the top banks matter. 
Alternatively, we restrict our analysis to a sample of firms from large countries, defined as those 
countries with more than 400 loans. Finally, we randomly draw 10 banks for each firm out of the 
top 20 banks in each country to sample more evenly across banks of different sizes. Columns 
(1)-(4) of Table 4 present the results of these alternative bank-firm pairs scheme. Again we find 
that bank-firm governance links positively affect the lead arranger choice.  
Next, we run specifications that do not use the dichotomous variable of whether a firm has a 
loan from a bank, as in the logit model in Table 3. We run instead an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression whose dependent variable is the logarithm of the volume of loans from bank i 
to firm j and a Poisson regression whose dependent variable is the number of actual loans from 
bank i to firm j. We also run a Tobit model where the dependent variable is the share that loans 
from bank i to firm j represent of all loans received by firm j. The positive relation between 
bank-firm governance links and the intensity of lending from a linked bank is robust across all 
these alternative tests. 
One concern with our findings is endogeneity of the presence of a bank as board member or 
                                                            
13 For example in the Netherlands, the top 20 banks includes four banks headquartered at the time in the Netherlands 
(ABN AMRO, ING, Rabobank, and NIB Capital Bank), six U.S. bank (Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley), three U.K. banks (HSBC, Barclays, and Royal Bank 
of Scotland), three French bank (BNP Paribas, Société Générale, and Credit Agricole), a German bank (Deutsche 
Bank), a Swiss Bank (Credit Suisse), a Belgian bank (Fortis), and an Italian Bank (Unicredit). 
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as an institutional equity holder. It may be the case that poorer quality firms tend to have 
governance links to banks to obtain easier access to credit. It may also be the case that the 
banking group has common information across its units that leads both its loan officer to lend 
and its fund manager to hold equity of the same firm, without one necessarily causing the other.  
Our international sample allows us to use instrumental variables likely to determine a bank-
firm governance link but not the choice of the lead arranger bank directly. The first is the degree 
of regulatory restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and commerce (or financial conglomerate 
restrictiveness) in place in each bank country. We use the index from the World Bank survey of 
banking regulations developed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004).14 As another bank-level 
instrument, we use a dummy indicating whether a bank is publicly listed instead of state-owned 
(e.g., WestLB in Germany) or a cooperative bank (e.g., Credit Agricole in France or Rabobank 
in the Netherlands), which are potentially more constrained than publicly listed banks from 
sitting on corporate boards or owning equity. We use other firm-level instruments likely to 
determine bank-firm governance links. We adopt the same variables used by Kroszner and 
Strahan (2001a) to explain banker representation on boards of non-financial firms, namely, firm 
size, short- and long-term leverage, tangible assets, and risk. 
Table 5 presents the results of a bivariate logit model where the bank-firm governance link 
is treated as endogenous using the instrumental variables described above.15 The first equation is 
a logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a 
bank-firm governance link. Like Kroszner and Strahan (2001a), we find that banks have a higher 
presence in larger firms, and in firms with low leverage and risk. Thus, bankers are present in 
                                                            
14 In our sample, the index is lowest in France, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K. and highest in the 
U.S. 
15 Following Wooldridge (2010), we use a bivariate logit model, as two-stage logit model estimates are both 
inefficient and inconsistent. 
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healthy firms and not in firms that might require bank presence to access credit. This eases 
concerns over the endogeneity of the bank-firm governance link. We find that restrictiveness on 
the mixing of banking and commerce limits banks’ presence on borrowers’ board of directors 
and also that non-publicly listed banks have fewer governance links to borrowers.  
The second equation is a logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy for the 
presence of a loan for each bank-firm pair. This second equation uses the specifications in 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 3, although we obtain similar estimates using a conditional logit 
model. We find that bank-firm governance links (board and institutional holdings) affect bank 
choice even after controlling for the endogeneity of a bank’s presence.16  
In the Internet Appendix, we report a few more robustness checks. We further address the 
direction of causality between a banker presence in the borrower’s board of directors and lending 
activity using panel data on bank-firm pairs for each year. We find that the addition of a banker 
to a board in the previous year leads to initiation of lending in the current year, but there is no 
evidence that a lending relation starts first and then a banker takes a board position in the year 
following. We also estimate a treatment effects model, as described in Greene (2008), for the 
number and volume of loans for each bank-firm pair.17 We continue to find that bank-firm 
governance links affect bank choice. The Heckman lambda selection variable is negative and 
significant, which indicates that banks tend to build governance links with firms with 
(unobservably) higher credit quality, rather than poorer credit quality firms. This helps to 
alleviate concerns that endogeneity is driving our findings. 
                                                            
16 Since the dependent variables (loan dummy and bank-firm governance link dummy) are dummy variables, we 
cannot apply the tests of instrument relevance and validity. We run a standard instrumental variable model and the 
Hansen’s overidentification tests confirm that the instruments meet the exclusion restriction. 
17 The treatment effects model considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment (i.e., bank-firm 
governance link) on another endogenous continuous variable. Thus, we use a continuous variable for the second-
stage dependent variable (number of loans or log volume of loans as in Table 4) instead of the dummy variable (as 
in the logit model of Table 3).    
20
2.3 Effect of financial crisis on credit supply 
Previous studies find evidence of credit rationing during banking crises but firms that are 
geographically close and have prior relationships with banks are less affected by supply-side 
effects than other similar firms. De Haas and Van Horen (2011) show that cross-border lending 
dropped the most to borrowers from distant countries during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
while Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011) find that the crisis induced a contraction in retail bank 
lending in Germany, although bank-depositor relationships helped to mitigate these supply-side 
effects. Schnabl (2011) find a reduction in cross-border lending to Peruvian banks after the 1998 
Russian default. 
Do borrowers with governance links to banks receive uninterrupted access to credit during a 
financial crisis? To answer this question, we test whether linked-firms are less likely to suffer a 
sudden stop in borrowing and face a lower drop in loans than non-linked firms after the start of 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The effect of the crisis on credit supply was dramatic, with banks 
on average reducing the volume of loans by about 70% during this period relative to the pre-
crisis period. 
To test whether a bank-firm link impacts the credit supply during the financial crisis, we 
estimate the following model: 
             ΔLoan Acitvityi,j = a0 + a1(Bank-Firm Link)i,j +  a2Xi  + a3Yi,j  + εi,j,                       (2) 
where the dependent variable, ΔLoan Activity, is the percentage change in the volume of loans or 
number of loans between bank i and firm j during the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
period, or a dummy variable that equals one if bank i acts as lead arranger to firm j in the pre-
crisis period but does not act as lead arranger in the crisis period (sudden stop). The crisis period 
is the period of time from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008 (July 1, 2007 
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through December 31, 2008). We estimate the model using OLS except for the sudden stop 
dependent variable for which we use a logit model. We control for other bank-level (Xi) and 
firm-bank level variables (Yi.j) as in equation (1). All explanatory variables are measured before 
the crisis period (i.e., as of December 2006). We follow De Haas and Van Horen (2011) and 
Schnabl (2011) and estimate the regression in first differences (in percentage), which we 
construct by collapsing and time-averaging the data for the months before and during the 
financial crisis.18  
Table 6 presents the estimates of equation (2). We run specifications that include borrower 
firm industry dummies and dummies for the country of origin of the borrower firm and of the 
bank. Estimates in columns (1) and (3) show the effect of a bank-firm governance link on the 
probability that a bank will keep supplying credit during the crisis. The probability that a bank 
will keep acting as lead arranger is higher by roughly 10% if the bank has a board or institutional 
holding link with the borrower firm versus a firm with no such link.  
Columns (5) and (7) of Table 6 show the results of models that use the percentage change in 
number of loans as a dependent variable. Columns (9) and (11) show the results using the 
percentage change in volume of loans. The bank-firm governance links coefficients are positive 
and significant in all specifications for board or institutional holding links. The estimates indicate 
that banks reduced the volume of loans to linked firms by about 6% less relative to non-linked 
firms during the crisis period.  
We also estimate equation (2) including firm and bank fixed effects that control for credit 
demand at the firm level and unobserved bank characteristics. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 6 
                                                            
18 Collapsing the data smooths out variation and generates conservative standard errors (Bertrand, Duffo, and 
Mullainathan 2004). We obtain similar results when we use a specification in levels and interact bank-firm 
governance links with an indicator variable for the crisis period. 
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show the results for the sudden stop dependent variable, and columns (6), (8), (10), and (12) 
show the results for the change in the number and volume of loans. The magnitude of the bank-
firm links coefficient is similar to the one with country and industry fixed effects. 
Finally, in untabulated tests, we examine how the relation between bank-firm governance 
links and credit supply during the financial crisis differs for banks that received a government 
bailout and those that did not.19 The effect of the crisis on credit supply should have been 
stronger for banks that were eventually bailed out as these banks were experiencing financial 
distress and capital constraints. An interesting question is whether these banks discriminate 
among borrowers according to governance links at a time when they were decreasing the credit 
supply. We find that the decrease in credit supply is stronger in the sample of bailout banks but 
bank-firm governance links attenuate quantity restrictions.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that bank involvement in a firm’s governance mitigates 
supply-side effects during a financial crisis. Bank-firm governance links seem to be particularly 
valuable at the time of a squeeze in credit to guarantee uninterrupted access to it. 
3. Do Bank-Firm Governance Links Affect Loan Pricing and Non-Pricing Terms? 
We have provided evidence that when a bank plays a role in a firm’s governance there is a higher 
probability that the bank will do future lending business with that firm. Now we examine the 
implications of a bank governance link for the pricing of loans and other contract terms. We 
perform these tests at the loan facility level. The sample consists of 17,181 bank-loan facilities 
for which we have bank-firm link variables, loan characteristics, bank variables, and borrower 
firm variables. 
                                                            
19 The list of banks that received bailout funds from the government during the crisis period is drawn from Laeven 
and Valencia (2010). 
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3.1 Loan pricing 
We first test whether bank-firm governance links affect loan pricing. We estimate the regression 
of loan spreads: 
 Loan Spreadi,j,k = a0 + a1(Bank-Firm Link)i,j,k + a2(Crisis Dummy) 
 + a3(Bank-Firm Link)i,j,k  (Crisis Dummy)  
 + a4Zk + a5Xi + a6Yj + εi,j,k,   (3) 
where the dependent variable, Loan Spread, is the all-in drawn spread of the loan facility, which 
includes the spread over LIBOR plus annual fees and up-front fees prorated over the life of the 
loan.20 The explanatory variables of interest (Bank-Firm Link) are dummy variables that take the 
value of one if the bank has a link to the borrower firm as of the end of the year prior to the loan 
initiation through board membership (Board Link Dummy) or via equity holdings through its 
asset management division (Institutional Holding Link Dummy). We test each bank-firm link 
measure separately, and then consider the two bank-firm governance link variables jointly.  
Regression equation (3) allows the effect of bank-firm governance links on loan spreads to 
differ between the periods before and during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The crisis started in 
the third quarter of 2007 when two things happened: (1) two Bear Stearns hedge funds that 
invested in subprime mortgages filed for bankruptcy and (2) the credit default swap spreads of 
major banks increased sharply (Brunnermeier 2010). Our tests use a dummy variable (Crisis 
Dummy), which takes a value of one for loans initiated between July 1, 2007 through December 
31, 2008. The crisis dummy measures the difference in loan spreads between the crisis period 
and the period before the crisis. We expect the crisis dummy coefficient to be positive because 
                                                            
20 In the Internet Appendix, we examine loan spreads without including fees as the dependent variables and find 
similar results. 
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borrower risk and the cost of bank funding both tend to go up during the financial crisis (Santos 
2011). The bank-firm governance link coefficient (Bank-Firm Link) measures the difference in 
loan spreads between linked-borrowers and non-linked borrowers in the period before the crisis. 
Finally, the coefficient on the interaction between the bank-firm governance link and the crisis 
dummy (Bank-Firm Link  Crisis Dummy) measures the difference in loan spreads between 
linked-borrowers and non-linked borrowers in the crisis period versus the non-crisis period.21 
We control for loan characteristics (Zk), bank characteristics (Xi), and borrower firm 
characteristics (Yj) in regression equation (3). The regressions also include borrower firm 
industry dummies, as well as dummies for the country of origin of both the firm and the bank. 
We adjust t-statistics for clustering at the firm and bank level.  
Table 7 presents estimates of regression equation (3). In column (1) the coefficient on bank-
firm governance links through board seats is significantly positive and implies that the presence 
of a bank member in the firm’s board of directors is associated with an added 7 bps spread 
charged relative to a firm with no such link during the 2003-2006 credit boom. Column (1) also 
shows that, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the effect of a board link during the crisis is 
reduced by 20 bps [see interaction term coefficient in column (1)]; this implies that borrowers 
with a board link pay lower spreads by 13 bps (= 7 - 20) than a borrower with no such link 
during the crisis period.  
In column (3) of Table 7, we can see that an institutional holdings link is associated with 15 
bps higher spreads charged to bank-linked borrowers during the 2003-2006 credit boom. The 
effect of an institutional holding link is reduced during the crisis, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. In this case, borrowers with an institutional holding link still pay higher 
                                                            
21 The results are not affected if we define the beginning of the crisis as the fourth quarter of 2007 (Santos 2011). 
These results are available in the Internet Appendix. 
25
spreads by 8 bps (= 15 - 7) than a borrower with no such link during the crisis period.  
In column (5) in Table 7, we include the two bank-firm governance links and confirm our 
main findings that bank-firm board links are associated with higher spreads before the crisis and 
lower spreads during the crisis, while bank-firm institutional holding links are associated with 
higher spreads both before and during the crisis. Table 7 also shows that the crisis dummy 
coefficient is positive, indicating that firms paid higher loan spreads during the crisis. The 
increase in loan spreads is greater than 30 bps, which is in line with estimates in Santos (2011). 
The regressions control for other proxies of the bank-firm relationship such as past loan 
activity (Bharath et al. 2011) and geographical proximity. We find no evidence that past loans 
and proximity impact loan spreads after controlling for bank-firm governance links. The 
European bank dummy coefficient is negative and significant, which is consistent with the 
findings in Carey and Nini (2007). In all specifications in Table 7 we also control for borrower 
firm characteristics and other non-pricing loan terms. As expected, we find that spreads are 
narrower for larger firms and more profitable firms, while firm stock risk tends to widen spreads. 
We control for borrower credit quality using a set of bond ratings dummies. We find that loans 
with lower ratings tend to have wider spreads. 
In terms of loan characteristics, we control for the following: (1) loan size; (2) whether the 
loan has collateral, is secured, or has a guarantor; (3) loan maturity; (4) covenants; (5) number of 
lenders; and (6) loan purpose and type dummy variables (not shown in Table 7 to save space).  
Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 7 include firm (and bank) fixed effects. The firm fixed 
effects specification controls for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity. Fixed effects 
methods solve “joint determination” problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable 
simultaneously determines both loan spreads and the bank-firm governance link. It is equivalent 
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to looking only at both within-firm and within-bank changes in bank-firm governance links. We 
find that the effect of a bank-firm governance link is still positive and significant in the pre-crisis 
period. Consistent with the OLS regression results, the effects are substantially reduced during 
the crisis and even become negative in the case of board links, which implies that borrowers with 
a board link pay lower spreads compared to borrowers with no such link during the crisis period. 
Our model of loan spreads accounts for a large set of controls for the borrower firm risk and 
credit quality. Since our controls for firm risk are mainly backward looking, we use the five-year 
senior credit default swap (CDS) spread as a predictor of firm credit risk and default probability. 
The CDS spread is a real-time indicator of changes in the credit quality of the borrower firms. 
We add the borrower’s CDS spread at the end of the year previous to the loan initiation as a 
regressor in column (7) of Table 7. The sample for this model is smaller because is limited to 
firms with CDS spread data available in Datastream/Credit Market Analytics. The borrower’s 
CDS spread coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that it contains additional 
information about the borrower’s credit risk. More importantly, we continue to find that the 
bank-firm governance link coefficients are positive and significant, while the interaction variable 
Crisis Dummy  Board Link Dummy is negative and significant. 
Overall, we find that the loan pricing is less favorable to the firm during credit booms if a 
bank has board seats or institutional holdings. During the crisis period, however, we find 
something different. In support of the intertemporal smoothing of loan interest rates hypothesis, 
loan pricing is more favorable to a firm if the bank has a board seat during financial crises. 
Taken together with the results in Section 2.3, these results suggest that bank-firm board links 
can provide uninterrupted access to funding at more favorable spreads and may allow firms to 
avoid financial distress during financial crises. In the case of institutional holding links, the 
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benefit of the bank-firm link accrues more to the bank since there is no evidence that loan pricing 
is more favorable during the crisis. Thus, our findings suggest that the eagerness to help the firm 
at the times of financial crises is stronger in the case of board links than in the case of 
institutional holdings links. 
3.2 Subsamples 
In Table 8, we estimate the model specification in column (5) of Table 7 for subsamples of firms. 
We first examine how the relation between bank-firm governance links and loan spreads differs 
for firms with and without access to public debt markets. Columns (1) and (2) present the results 
of the loan spread regressions estimated separately for the samples of firms with a public debt 
rating (rated firms) and firms without a rating (unrated firms). Chava and Purnanandam (2010) 
suggest that rated firms are likely to be less bank-dependent as they have access to public debt 
markets.22 We find that the positive association between board links and loan spreads is 
significant only in the sample of unrated firms. Interestingly, the asymmetric effect during the 
crisis is significant only for unrated firms. Unrated firms with bankers on the board of directors 
are the ones that pay higher loan spreads during credit booms but then benefit from lower 
spreads during financial crises. Intertemporal smoothing of loan rates matters more for bank-
dependent firms. Institutional holding links are associated with higher spreads for both rated and 
unrated firms and there is no evidence of intertemporal smoothing in this case.  
We next examine the relation between bank-firm governance links and loan spreads for 
borrowers with different levels of credit risk. We use the five-year senior credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads as a measure of credit risk and classify firms whose CDS spread is above the 
yearly median as high CDS spread firms and firms whose CDS spread is below the yearly 
                                                            
22 We obtain consistent findings if we exclude speculative grade firms (i.e., ratings BB or below) from the group of 
rated firms. 
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median as low CDS spread firms.23 The results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 8 show that banks 
charge higher spreads to linked firms but then smooth rates during the crisis only for the sample 
of high CDS spread firms. These findings indicate that the costs and benefits of bank-firm 
governance links mainly accrue to firms with higher levels of credit risk. 
We then analyze whether the effect of bank-firm links and intertemporal smoothing of loan 
rates is more pronounced when borrowers use local banks as lead arrangers. This test can only be 
implemented in our worldwide sample of syndicated loans. In Table 8, we split the sample into 
loans where the bank and the firm are located in the same country (column (5)) and loans where 
they are based in different countries (column (6)). We find a positive relation between loan 
spreads and governance links in both samples in the credit boom period. The negative 
association between board links and loan spreads during the financial crisis is significant only if 
bank and firm are from the same country. We conclude that intertemporal smoothing of loan 
rates takes place when the geographic proximity between banks and borrowers facilitates the use 
of soft information. In the case of institutional holding links, we find higher spreads regardless of 
the location of banks and firms and there is no evidence of intertemporal smoothing. 
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 8 present the results of the loan spread regressions separately 
for non-U.S. firms and U.S. firms. The positive relation between loan spreads and board links is 
positive and significant in both subsamples, while institutional holding links seems to matter 
only for U.S. firms. The 2007-2008 financial crisis had a bigger effect on U.S. banks and firms 
and therefore we only find significant evidence of intertemporal smoothing of loans rates in the 
subsample of U.S. firms in the case of board links (at the 5% level) and institutional holding 
links (at the 10% level).  
                                                            
23 We obtain similar findings when we split the sample by changes in CDS spread. 
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Finally, in columns (9) and (10) of Table 8 we examine the relation between bank-firm 
governance links and loan spreads depending on the level of distress a bank is facing during the 
crisis. We examine whether a bank received a government bailout and suspect that the effect of 
the crisis on loan spreads is stronger for banks that were eventually bailed out by governments as 
these banks faced higher capital constraints. We find that there is only evidence of intertemporal 
smoothing of loan rates in the sample of bailout banks, as shown by the negative and significant 
coefficient of the interaction variable Crisis  Board Link Dummy in column (9). This indicates 
that firms with board links to distressed banks experienced a lower increase in loan spreads 
during the crisis than firms with no such link.  
3.3 Endogeneity 
An important concern with our findings on loan spreads is the potential endogeneity of the bank-
firm link. The evidence so far is consistent with the notion that banks with control rights are able 
to charge higher interest rates to connected firms during credit booms, but offer more 
competitive interest rates during financial crises. Without further investigation, we cannot 
conclude that a bank’s position influences the loan spread. It could be that we find higher spreads 
in credit booms because banks tend to have governance links to poorer quality firms. This 
selection bias is indeed a concern because low quality firms would pay higher spreads, and banks 
may play a role in governance precisely when a firm is in financial difficulty.    
We implement two methodologies to handle this endogeneity issue. The first method is an 
instrumental variables estimation using instruments that are correlated with the bank’s 
involvement in firms’ governance but do not affect directly loan spreads, except through this 
channel. We use two different variables as instruments for the existence of bank-firm governance 
links. The first is the index of regulatory restrictions on mixing banking and commerce from the 
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World Bank survey of banking regulations (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004) that has an impact 
on the likelihood of a bank-firm governance link. The second is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a bank is publicly listed. Privately held banks are typically more constrained in holding 
board seats and equity stakes.24  
We employ two-stage least-squares (2SLS) methods using instruments for our endogenous 
variables. We use the fitted value of the first state logit regression of the bank-firm governance 
link in the second-stage regression since the dependent variable – loan spread – is continuous. 
Wooldridge (2010) shows that estimating a logit equation for a discrete choice variable in the 
first stage and using the fitted value in the second stage regression (with a continuous dependent 
variable) leads to consistent estimates of the coefficients.  
Table 9 presents results of the instrumental variables estimation of loan spreads. The first-
stage regression results support the view that board links are negatively associated with the 
mixing banking and commerce regulation index and also that non-publicly listed banks have 
fewer governance links to borrowers. Institutional holding links, however, are positively 
associated with the mixing banking and commerce index. F-statistics (reported at the end of the 
table) indicate the rejection of the hypotheses that instruments can be excluded from the first-
stage regressions, which suggests that the instruments are not weak.  
The second-stage results (columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)) in Table 9 show that the presence of a 
banker on a firm’s board of directors or as an institutional shareholder is associated with higher 
loan spreads before the crisis, correcting for the endogeneity of these bank-firm governance 
                                                            
24 In our sample, private banks are usually state-owned or cooperative banks. A potential concern is that 
government-owned banks charge subsidized (low) interest rates during the crisis period, which may affect our 
instrumental variable estimates. We obtain consistent findings when we estimate the instrumental variable models in 
Table 9 with a sample that excludes government-owned banks. These results are available in the Internet Appendix. 
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links. Moreover, we find that the effect of board links on spreads is significantly reduced during 
the crisis period. In contrast, firms with institutional holdings links do not seem to benefit from 
better loan pricing during the crisis and therefore these firms just pay the cost of the link. It is 
also important to notice that relative to the results in Table 7, the instrumental variable estimates 
indicate that the magnitude of the positive relation between loan spreads and links is stronger in 
the pre-crisis period, while the magnitude of reduction during the crisis is similar. Thus, there is 
stronger evidence of a cost to firms of bank links and weaker evidence of a benefit to firms.  
In this specification, we have more instruments than endogenous variables, so we can test 
for the exogeneity of the instruments using overidentification tests. Results of Hansen’s 
overidentification tests (reported at the end of Table 8) confirm the quality of the instruments, 
showing that they are not related to loan spreads in any other way than through their impact on 
the governance link. At the same time, the instrumental variables estimation results should be 
interpreted with caution, because the theoretical justifications for the instruments for bank-firm 
governance links is not very strong. 
The results are robust to the use of a treatment effects model (see Internet Appendix), as 
described in Greene (2008), as an alternative to the instrumental variables estimation. The first 
stage is a treatment probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating a bank-firm link. The first-stage results are consistent with the instrumental variables 
method results. The second-stage results again indicate that linked borrowers pay higher spreads 
during credit booms but tend to pay lower spreads during financial crises, especially when there 
is a link by representation on the board of directors.  
The second alternative method is to limit the sample to firms that have at least one bank-firm 
governance link, so that we can compare loan spreads for firms that take loans both from linked 
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banks and non-linked banks. If the reason we find an interest rate increase is that banks have 
governance links in (unobservably) riskier firms, then these firms should pay the same interest 
rate when they borrow from one of these banks or from a bank that has no governance link with 
them. There are 203 firms in our sample that borrow from a bank with a board link and from a 
bank with no such link, and 548 firms that borrow from a bank with an institutional holdings link 
and from a bank with no such link. We estimate a model with firm fixed effects in order to get a 
within-firm comparison. In results reported in the Internet Appendix, we show that firms pay 
higher loan spreads when they borrow from a bank with a board link versus when they borrow 
from a bank with no board link in the period before the crisis. We also find that, during the 
financial crisis, firms pay lower spreads when they borrow from a bank with a board link. 
Additionally, firms pay higher loan spreads, both before and during the crisis, when they borrow 
from a bank that has an institutional holding link. These results show that the loan spread results 
are unlikely to be driven by selection effects.25 
3.4 Non-pricing loan terms 
The role of a lead arranger bank in the borrower firm’s governance could also potentially impact 
non-pricing loan terms, such as collateral, financial covenants, maturity, or amount. We 
investigate the relation between these non-pricing loan terms and bank-firm governance links in 
Table 10. The specifications are similar to those in Table 7 for loan spreads.  
Column (1) of Table 10 presents the results of a probit model for the inclusion of collateral 
in the loan contract (Secured). There is no evidence that bank-firm links impact collateral 
requirements of the loan. Column (2) presents the results of a probit model for the inclusion of 
                                                            
25 We also obtain consistent findings using the propensity score matching methodology employed by Drucker and 
Puri (2005) and Bharath et al. (2011) to further address endogeneity concerns. These results are available in the 
Internet Appendix. 
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dividend restrictions in the loan contract, which is a form of financial covenant. There is no 
evidence that dividend restrictions would be alleviated if there is a governance link. Column (3) 
presents the results of a regression where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan 
maturity. We do not find evidence that maturity is extended; it is actually shortened if banks 
have an institutional holding link. Finally, column (4) presents the results of a regression where 
the dependent variable is the loan amount (as a percentage of total assets) granted to borrowers. 
Borrowers with governance links obtain larger loans than borrowers with no such links. 
Table 10 also investigates the effect of the crisis on non-pricing loan terms. There is limited 
evidence that collateral requirement and dividend restrictions become more frequent during the 
crisis, while there is significant evidence of an increase in loan maturity. Furthermore, borrowers 
with bank-firm governance links have not been affected in a significantly different way from 
borrowers with no such links. 
Overall, there is evidence that bank-firm governance links affect loan spreads, but there is no 
evidence of relaxing or tightening of non-pricing loan terms. The only exception is loan amounts 
(and to some extent maturity), as governance links seem to give access to larger loans.  
To the extent that price and non-price terms of loans are jointly determined, the true effects 
of relationships on these variables may be obscured. To address this concern, we re-estimate the 
model specifications above for the spread, maturity, and collateral terms of a bank loan contract 
using an instrumental variable approach. As in Bharath et al. (2011), we assume a unidirectional 
relation between the price (spread) and non-price (collateral requirement and maturity) terms. In 
particular, we assume that while maturity and collateral affect each other (bidirectional 
relationship), spread is only affected by maturity and collateral (unidirectional relationship). We 
employ 2SLS methods using instruments for our endogenous variables following Bharath et al. 
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(2011). We use the default spread at the time the loan is made and the average spread of loans 
completed over the previous six months, as an instrument for loan spreads. We use asset 
maturity, which is a key factor that affects the debt maturity structure of corporations, as an 
instrument for loan maturity. Loan concentration (i.e., the ratio of loan amount to existing debt 
plus loan amount) is employed as an instrumental variable that affects collateralization of the 
debt.  
Results in the Internet Appendix confirm the effect of bank-firm governance links on loan 
spreads controlling for the joint determination of maturity and collateral. The change of 
econometric specification produces some impact on the magnitude of the effects but we still find 
a positive effect of board links in the period before the crisis and a negative effect during the 
crisis period. There is a positive and significant effect of institutional holding links on loan 
spreads both before and during the crisis. In addition, there is some evidence that institutional 
holding links have a negative effect on loan maturity. The coefficients of loan terms and 
instruments are in line with those in Bharath et al. (2011). 
3.5 Loan syndicate concentration 
Bank-firm governance links may also affect the number of lead arrangers and lenders in the loan 
syndicate. A bank-firm link may improve information flows between the bank and the firm, as 
the borrower may be inclined to reveal more information, and the bank itself has greater 
incentives to produce information. Recurring loan transactions and delivery of other financial 
services imply that non-transferable information can be accumulated in the bank-firm relation. If 
there is indeed an information advantage, we expect to find a higher level of loan syndicate 
concentration (i.e., connected borrowers use fewer lead arrangers than non-connected 
borrowers).  
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Columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 present the results of regressions where the dependent 
variables are the logarithm of the number of lenders and lead arrangers in each loan. We find that 
both the presence of a banker on a firm’s board of directors and bank institutional equity stakes 
are negatively associated with the number of lead arrangers and lenders in the syndicate. There is 
no evidence, however, that affiliated institutional ownership increases loan concentration.  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 also investigate the effect of the crisis. There is evidence 
that the number of lenders significantly decreased during the crisis, while there is evidence of an 
increase in the number of lead arrangers. This is consistent with the evidence in De Haas and 
Van Horen (2011). Borrowers with governance links seem to have triggered an additional 
reduction in number of lenders, consistent with the idea that the syndicate concentration 
increased for the borrowers with access to credit in better terms during the crisis period. 
Overall, borrowers with governance links to banks use fewer lead arrangers and lenders. 
This is consistent with the findings in Section 2 that bank-firm governance links make it more 
likely that a bank will be chosen as a lead arranger for future loans. The evidence here is also 
consistent with the idea that the linked bank is willing to engage in intertemporal smoothing of 
loan interest rates because it holds a large share of a firm’s loans. 
4. Conclusion 
We provide evidence on the effects of bank-firm governance links in the syndicated loan market 
around the world. A large sample of loans enables us to examine the effects of banks’ role in 
corporate governance through board seats and equity holdings via bank-affiliated institutional 
money managers. We find that during the 2003-2006 credit boom, banks lent more and charged 
higher loan spreads to firms in which they had control rights. During the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, however, borrowers with board links to banks paid lower loan spreads than borrowers with 
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no such links. This evidence is consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates. It suggests 
that a firm benefits from bank involvement in its governance through board representation during 
a financial crisis, but at the cost of paying higher loan spreads during normal times. In the case of 
institutional equity holdings links, borrowers with links paid higher loan spreads than borrowers 
with no such links both before and during the crisis, although the difference in spreads is lower 
during the crisis. 
Our findings illustrate that universal banks play governance roles in companies, which has 
implications for financial intermediation. Few modern-day regulatory issues have been as 
controversial as relaxing the separation of investment and commercial banking. Unlike 
international regulations on bank capital requirements as in the Basel Accords, there is no 
international coordination on regulation of bank control over non-financial firms such as board 
seats or equity holdings through bank-affiliated asset management divisions.  
Our evidence suggests possible conflicts of interest between the role of lender and the role 
of insider in a firm. Note, however, that firms could also benefit from governance links to banks 
if such links assure uninterrupted access to funding at competitive interest rates and if they allow 
firms to avoid financial distress during financial crises. Future work should further examine the 
role of universal banks in credit shock periods, especially given the upheavals in the banking 
industry during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
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Summary Statistics of Sample of Loans and Bank-Firm Governance Links 
This table describes the sample of syndicated loan facilities in DealScan for which we are able to obtain financial and market 
information on the borrower firm in Datastream/Worldscope. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample 
period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2008. Panel A presents the number of loans, volume of loans, number of 
borrower firms, and number of loans with bank-firm governance links by country of the borrower firm. Panel B presents the same 
statistics for the top 30 banks in the loan sample. 
















Australia 515 88.0 39 39 59 0 
Belgium 71 15.9 10 8 10 1 
Brazil 130 44.8 13 0 11 0 
Canada 233 73.5 50 22 39 0 
Chile 63 7.0 13 0 4 0 
Finland 140 35.3 19 9 13 4 
France 1,408 336.0 74 150 65 13 
Germany 892 327.0 45 93 48 16 
Hong Kong 236 15.5 17 0 14 0 
India 273 9.6 15 0 14 0 
Italy 471 153.0 21 62 22 0 
Japan 148 30.5 18 0 41 4 
Korea (South) 320 14.8 26 6 53 4 
Malaysia 17 1.6 11 0 3 0 
Mexico 267 46.2 13 0 11 0 
Netherlands 528 78.3 36 50 42 29 
Norway 151 19.1 15 8 21 0 
Singapore 94 9.9 11 0 17 0 
Spain 1,025 201.0 37 28 20 1 
Sweden 310 41.6 29 21 47 0 
Switzerland 218 43.5 14 0 16 0 
Taiwan 218 7.3 28 0 6 0 
U.K. 1,627 241.0 136 40 181 0 
U.S. 6,745 2,630.0 1,118 261 847 6 
Other (18) 1,081 175.1 77 23 68 3 
  
Total 17,181 4,645.5 1,885 820 1,672 81 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics by Bank  


















JPMorgan Chase U.S. 2 2,186 961.0 649 138 178 0 
Citigroup U.S. 1 1,782 815.0 548 90 135 0 
Bank of America U.S. 4 1,580 497.0 574 41 271 6 
Deutsche Bank Germany  21 649 190.0 216 47 145 8 
Royal Bank of Scotland U.K. 6 793 173.0 251 8 29 0 
BNP Paribas France  10 764 168.0 296 77 139 3 
Barclays Bank U.K. 13 667 167.0 224 10 97 0 
Credit Suisse Group Switzerland  27 445 141.0 139 5 82 0 
Wachovia Corporation U.S. 18 518 131.0 189 9 85 0 
ABN AMRO Bank Netherlands  20 647 122.0 247 36 0 1 
HSBC Holdings U.K. 3 607 121.0 247 16 10 0 
Société Générale France  23 534 120.0 181 32 8 5 
Credit Agricole Groupe France  5 689 105.0 236 34 48 4 
UBS Switzerland  19 157 87.5 72 1 7 0 
Santander Central Hispano Spain  12 256 65.9 62 5 2 0 
ING Bank Netherlands  17 374 47.9 144 24 31 21 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Fin. Japan  7 266 47.8 119 0 2 4 
Merrill Lynch Bank U.S. 115 122 47.5 46 2 2 0 
UniCredit Italy  39 284 47.2 82 34 30 0 
BBVA Spain  33 254 46.2 87 18 8 1 
Commerzbank Germany  45 204 43.5 84 32 33 8 
SunTrust Banks U.S. 61 149 32.9 60 0 1 0 
Groupe Banques Populaires France  36 204 32.8 84 10 13 1 
Fortis Bank Belgium  34 186 31.1 89 11 23 7 
Scotiabank Canada  46 143 29.2 59 6 13 0 
Wells Fargo U.S. 16 143 29.1 60 0 27 0 
Banca Intesa Italy  30 87 25.8 28 14 5 0 
Royal Bank of Canada Canada  49 87 24.6 32 9 9 0 
Nordea Bank Sweden  44 145 23.4 66 10 18 0 
Lloyds TSB U.K. 26 162 21.1 73 8 17 0 
Other (72) 2,097 251.0 93 204 12 




This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of each variable. The sample consists of 17,181 
syndicated loan facilities in DealScan for which we are able to obtain financial and market information on the borrower firm in 
Datastream/Worldscope. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2008. Variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% level. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
    Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Loan Variables 
Loan spread 124.970 75.000 122.650 15.000 900.000 
Rating AAA-AA dummy 0.021 0 0.143 0 1 
Rating A dummy 0.129 0 0.335 0 1 
Rating BBB dummy 0.184 0 0.387 0 1 
Rating BB dummy 0.144 0 0.351 0 1 
Rating B-C dummy 0.090 0 0.286 0 1 
Loan amount 1,210 450 2,550 1 32,200 
Secured dummy 0.235 0 0.424 0 1 
Maturity 4.716 5.000 2.430 0.667 22.000 
Dividend restriction dummy 0.206 0 0.404 0 1 
Senior dummy 0.991 1 0.097 0 1 
Guarantor dummy 0.082 0 0.275 0 1 
Sponsor dummy 0.120 0 0.325 0 1 
Number of lenders 13.782 11 10.973 1 77 
Number of arrangers 5.719 3 5.583 1 27 
Syndicated loan dummy 0.892 1 0.311 0 1 
Corporate purpose dummy 0.274 0 0.446 0 1 
Refinance dummy 0.255 0 0.436 0 1 
Takeover dummy 0.116 0 0.320 0 1 
Working capital dummy 0.099 0 0.299 0 1 
Credit line dummy 0.425 0 0.494 0 1 
Term loan dummy 0.265 0 0.441 0 1 
Bridge loan dummy 0.011 0 0.103 0 1 
Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 0.048 0 0.213 0 1 
Institutional holding link dummy 0.097 0 0.296 0 1 
Insider stake link dummy 0.005 0 0.069 0 1 
Past loan relationship dummy 0.440 0 0.496 0 1 
Same region dummy 0.707 1 0.455 0 1 
Same country dummy 0.306 0 0.461 0 1 
Bank Variables 
Bank ranking 21.768 10 36.998 1 500 
Bank size 56,600 38,300 53,600 2,099 188,000 
Bank return on equity 11.631 13.080 6.210 -3.840 22.830 
European bank dummy 0.516 1 0.500 0 1 
Bank publicly-listed dummy 0.960 1 0.196 0 1 
Borrower Firm Variables 
Firm size 11,000 4,153 16,500 7 91,700 
Total debt 0.329 0.307 0.179 0.000 1.000 
Short term debt 0.229 0.169 0.228 0.000 1.000 
Tangibility 0.361 0.331 0.226 0.006 0.899 
R&D expenditures 0.009 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.111 
Market-to-book 2.450 2.030 1.698 0.048 6.984 
Profitability 0.065 0.054 0.104 -0.132 0.420 
Interest coverage 10.560 7.026 10.635 0.725 46.087 
Net working capital 0.696 0.363 0.963 -0.123 3.944 
Stock volatility 0.337 0.282 0.225 0.000 1.702 
Payout 0.504 0.208 1.140 -1.615 7.254 
  Credit default swap spread 132.116 48.500 245.113 1.300 2960.300 
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 Table 3 
Lead Arranger Bank Choice and Bank-Firm Governance Links 
This table presents results for a logit model of whether the existence of a bank-firm (i, j) link through a board member or equity 
institutional holdings prior to the loan affects the probability that firm j chooses bank i as lead arranger in the syndicated loan 
market. For each borrower firm j we create a choice set of 20 potential arrangers (top 20 ranked by volume of loans in each 
country). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if bank i acted as lead arranger in at least one loan facility 
to firm j. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Refer to Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 1.377*** 1.260*** 1.153*** 1.189*** 
(10.10) (11.88) (8.66) (11.20) 
Institutional holding link dummy 0.735*** 0.570*** 0.680*** 0.534*** 
(9.68) (11.24) (9.11) (10.47) 
Insider stake link dummy 1.410*** 1.440*** 1.277*** 1.884*** 
(4.62) (4.53) (4.13) (3.82) 
Past loan relationship dummy 2.014*** 1.976*** 1.957*** 
(14.35) (13.96) (13.65) 
Same region dummy 0.986*** 0.950*** 0.920*** 
(3.88) (3.33) (3.24) 
Bank Variables 
Bank ranking -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
(-4.89) (-5.94) (-6.03) 
Bank size (log) -0.133 -0.069 -0.074 
(-1.04) (-0.60) (-0.65) 
Bank return on equity -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
(-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.29) 
European bank dummy -0.459*** -0.408* -0.405* 
(-2.86) (-1.91) (-1.93) 
Borrower firm industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Borrower firm country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Borrower firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Bank fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 37,267 32,756 37,267 32,756 37,267 32,756 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.13 
Impact of bank-firm governance links on the probability of being chosen as the lead arranger using 
columns (1) and (3) 
Probability of being chosen (%) 
Board link dummy = 1 37.4 
Board link dummy = 0 15.7 
Change in probability 21.8 
Institutional holding link dummy = 1 22.6 
Institutional holding link dummy = 0 13.4 
Change in probability    9.2       
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 Table 4 
Lead Arranger Bank Choice and Bank-Firm Governance Links: Robustness 
This table presents results of models that test whether the existence of a bank-firm (i, j) link through a board member or equity 
institutional holdings prior to the loan affects the choice of lead arranger in the syndicated loan market. For each borrower firm j 
we create a choice set of 20 potential arrangers (top 20 banks in terms of volume of loans in each country). Columns (1)-(4) 
present results of a logit model of a dummy variable that equals one if bank i acted as lead arranger in at least one loan facility to 
firm j using the top 10 banks in each country, the top 5 banks in each country, a sample of countries with more than 400 loans, or 
a sample of randomly selected ten banks for each firm out of the top 20 banks in each country. Column (5) presents results of an 
OLS regression of log volume of loans from bank i to firm j. Column (6) presents results of a Poisson regression of the number of 
loans from bank i to firm j. Column (7) presents results of a Tobit regression (left censored at zero and right censored at one) of 
the share that loans from bank i to firm j represent of all loans of firm j. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The 
sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Regressions include borrower firm industry fixed effects and borrower firm and bank 
country fixed effects. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level 
clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 

















Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 1.218*** 1.182*** 1.110*** 1.132*** 4.953*** 0.643*** 0.249*** 
(9.73) (6.70) (7.72) (6.56) (7.21) (9.78) (7.57) 
Institutional holding link dummy 0.623*** 0.600*** 0.711*** 0.681*** 1.795*** 0.469*** 0.140*** 
(7.60) (6.43) (8.35) (8.93) (5.54) (10.27) (6.24) 
Insider stake link dummy 1.100*** 0.794* 1.347*** 1.636*** 4.821*** 0.486* 0.229*** 
(2.93) (1.84) (2.93) (3.72) (4.44) (1.71) (2.88) 
Past loan relationship dummy 1.668*** 1.620*** 2.027*** 1.938*** 7.922*** 0.924*** 0.545*** 
(14.98) (13.14) (10.24) (13.21) (16.24) (14.46) (9.41) 
Same region dummy 1.166*** 0.884*** 0.976*** 0.933*** 1.966*** 0.852*** 0.319*** 
(3.74) (2.95) (3.43) (3.66) (2.63) (17.14) (3.57) 
Bank Variables 
Bank ranking -0.014 -0.022 -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.005*** 
(-1.33) (-1.41) (-4.88) (-6.06) (-4.90) (-15.23) (-31.41) 
Bank size (log) -0.001 -0.149 -0.115 -0.124 0.217 -0.055 -0.023 
(-0.00) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-1.03) (0.78) (-1.22) (-0.62) 
Bank return on equity -0.006 0.007 -0.016 0.003 -0.064 -0.012** -0.001 
(-0.31) (0.20) (-0.67) (0.15) (-1.22) (-2.55) (-0.24) 
European bank dummy -0.549** -0.161 -0.348 -0.440** -10.603*** -0.295*** -0.145** 
(-2.57) (-0.46) (-1.59) (-2.25) (-4.33) (-4.86) (-2.41) 
Observations 20,051 11,594 28,485 18,622 37,244 37,282 34,117 





Lead Arranger Bank Choice and Bank-Firm Governance Links: Bivariate Logit  
This table presents results of a bivariate logit model predicting the existence of a bank-firm governance link and the existence of 
a loan for each bank-firm pair. Instrumental variables are used to correct for the endogeneity of bank-firm governance links 
through a board member or equity institutional holdings. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample period 
is from 2003 to 2008. The loan dummy logistic regressions include the same bank variables (coefficients not shown) as in Table 
3. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 













Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 11.099*** 
(5.40) 
Institutional holding link dummy 2.075*** 
(6.27) 
Insider stake link dummy 1.430*** 1.348*** 
(4.01) (3.65) 
Past loan relationship dummy 2.023*** 2.002*** 
(12.40) (11.71) 
Same region dummy 0.930*** 0.917*** 
(3.61) (3.41) 
Instruments 
Mixing banking-commerce regulation index -0.274*** 0.098 
(2.99) (0.69) 
Bank publicly-listed dummy 1.630** 1.880*** 
(2.09) (3.45) 
Firm size (log) 0.750*** 0.573*** 
(15.99) (12.38) 
Total debt -0.740** -1.279*** 
(-2.38) (-6.43) 
Short term debt -0.302 -1.333*** 
(-1.12) (-5.28) 
Tangibility -0.456 -0.596*** 
(-1.27) (-4.04) 
Stock volatility -0.574* -0.895*** 
(-1.78) (-4.85) 
Borrower firm industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower firm country fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Bank country fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 34,032 31,216 34,032 31,216 
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.14 
Impact of bank-firm governance links on the probability of being chosen as the lead arranger using 
columns (2) and (4) 
Probability of being chosen (%) 
Board link dummy = 1 99.9 
Board link dummy = 0 13.6 
Change in probability 86.3 
Institutional holding link dummy = 1 38.8 
Institutional holding link dummy = 0 9.3 




Effect of Crisis on Bank Lending and Bank-Firm Governance Links 
This table presents results of regressions of changes on bank lending on a bank-firm governance link through a board member or equity institutional holdings in the crisis period 
versus the pre-crisis period. The crisis period is the period of time from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008. Columns (1)-(4) present results of a logit model of a 
dummy variable (sudden stop) that equals one if bank i acts as lead arranger to firm j in the pre-crisis period but does not act as lead arranger in the crisis period. Columns (5)-(12) 
present results of OLS and firm fixed effects regression of the percentage change in the volume of loans or number of loans between bank i and firm j in the crisis period compared 
to the pre-crisis period. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Regressions include the same bank variables (coefficients not 
shown) as in Table 3. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) 
    Logit Sudden Stop   % Change in Number of Loans   % Change in Volume of Loans 
Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy -0.671*** -0.448** 0.053** 0.032** 0.065** 0.064** 
(-3.89) (-2.28) (2.25) (1.98) (1.99) (1.97) 
Institutional holding link dummy -0.650*** -1.273*** 0.056*** 0.039** 0.079*** 0.064** 
(-6.21) (-3.08) (4.52) (2.04) (3.62) (2.23) 
Past loan relationship dummy -0.108 -0.093 -0.004 -0.006 -0.027 -0.031 
(-0.83) (-0.71) (-0.22) (-0.34) (-1.06) (-1.17) 
Same region dummy -0.510*** -0.385** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.084*** 0.071*** 
(-2.80) (-2.11) (4.24) (3.48) (4.02) (3.28) 
Borrower firm industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Borrower firm country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Borrower firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Bank fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,123 4,123 4,123 4,123 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.105 0.722 0.109 0.722 0.083 0.676 0.085 0.677 
Impact of bank-firm governance links on the probability of having sudden stop using columns (1) and (3) 
Probability of sudden stop (%) 
Board link dummy = 1 69.0 
Board link dummy = 0 79.7 
Change in probability -10.7 
Institutional holding link dummy = 1 74.5 
Institutional holding link dummy = 0 83.9 




Loan Spread and Bank-Firm Governance Links 
This table presents results of OLS and fixed effects regressions of loan spread on a bank-firm governance link through a board 
member or equity institutional holdings. The sample consists of syndicated loan facilities in DealScan for which we are able to 
obtain financial and market information on the borrower firm in Datastream/Worldscope. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) 
are excluded. The sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Regressions include loan purpose and type dummies. Refer to Appendix 
A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 6.822** 4.995** 6.720** 5.068** 8.123** 
(2.16) (1.97) (2.18) (1.96) (2.05) 
Institutional holding link dummy 15.483*** 9.789*** 15.538*** 9.834*** 17.499** 
(3.05) (3.38) (3.06) (3.39) (2.34) 
Insider stake link dummy -6.741 -1.729 -3.846 -0.060 -5.953 -1.489 -1.524 
(-0.64) (-0.24) (-0.38) (-0.01) (-0.57) (-0.21) (-0.07) 
Past loan relationship dummy 0.448 0.541 0.764 0.673 0.629 0.556 3.849 
(0.19) (0.27) (0.33) (0.34) (0.27) (0.28) (1.27) 
Same region dummy -0.742 0.605 -0.656 0.783 -0.813 0.618 -1.550 
(-0.27) (0.34) (-0.23) (0.44) (-0.29) (0.34) (-0.42) 
Financial Crisis Variables 
Crisis dummy 34.592*** 33.239*** 33.905*** 32.884*** 35.167*** 33.680*** 24.727** 
(4.91) (5.62) (4.83) (5.50) (4.91) (5.57) (2.40) 
Crisis dummy x  -20.230** -12.059** -21.776** -12.481** -16.257** 
Board link dummy (-2.10) (-1.99) (-2.27) (-2.12) (-2.16) 
Crisis dummy x  -7.496 -8.980 -6.358 -8.152 -10.335 
Institutional holding link dummy (-0.65) (-1.17) (-0.55) (-1.07) (-0.73) 
Loan Variables 
AAA-AA rating dummy -50.876*** -71.137*** -52.222*** -71.472*** -51.837*** -71.262*** -49.530*** 
(-6.84) (-3.38) (-6.94) (-3.39) (-6.94) (-3.39) (-5.18) 
A rating dummy -41.949*** -24.865*** -42.323*** -24.909*** -42.407*** -24.968*** -33.829*** 
(-7.80) (-2.99) (-7.96) (-3.00) (-7.97) (-3.00) (-4.87) 
BBB rating dummy -30.959*** -32.202*** -30.779*** -32.006*** -30.872*** -32.101*** -28.891*** 
(-6.91) (-3.65) (-6.88) (-3.63) (-6.90) (-3.64) (-4.38) 
BB rating dummy 10.595* -3.103 10.600 -2.785 10.544 -3.078 13.193 
(1.65) (-0.30) (1.64) (-0.27) (1.63) (-0.30) (1.47) 
B-C rating dummy 47.490*** 5.050 47.553*** 5.355 47.477*** 5.085 45.030*** 
(6.23) (0.31) (6.25) (0.33) (6.24) (0.31) (3.49) 
Loan amount (log) -6.246*** -4.216*** -6.205*** -4.178*** -6.223*** -4.184*** -1.486 
(-3.99) (-2.81) (-3.99) (-2.79) (-3.99) (-2.80) (-0.70) 
Secured dummy 36.193*** 12.705** 36.208*** 12.514** 36.171*** 12.506** 44.093*** 
(7.11) (2.34) (7.11) (2.30) (7.10) (2.30) (5.26) 
Maturity (log) 2.228 7.261** 2.429 7.311** 2.399 7.283** -0.686 
(0.79) (2.44) (0.86) (2.47) (0.85) (2.46) (-0.19) 
Dividend restriction dummy 0.473 5.414 0.337 5.392 0.349 5.429 6.920 
(0.11) (1.06) (0.08) (1.06) (0.08) (1.07) (1.34) 
Senior dummy -371.985*** -365.203*** -370.992*** -365.177*** -371.113*** -365.234*** -374.241*** 
(-8.09) (-8.45) (-8.05) (-8.44) (-8.05) (-8.44) (-4.66) 
Guarantor dummy -9.823** -6.185 -10.214** -6.436 -10.262** -6.444 -11.766 
(-1.97) (-1.04) (-2.04) (-1.08) (-2.06) (-1.09) (-1.52) 
Sponsor dummy 82.538*** 68.496*** 82.629*** 68.709*** 82.679*** 68.699*** 87.228*** 
(10.94) (6.58) (10.96) (6.61) (10.98) (6.63) (6.38) 
Number of lenders (log) -3.810* -4.571** -3.656 -4.499** -3.677 -4.509** -2.315 
(-1.69) (-2.09) (-1.62) (-2.07) (-1.63) (-2.07) (-0.79) 
Syndicated loan dummy 2.648 -2.448 2.636 -2.649 2.675 -2.668 5.606 
(0.43) (-0.33) (0.43) (-0.36) (0.44) (-0.36) (0.91) 
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Table 7: continued 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








Bank ranking 0.056* -0.024 0.061* -0.026 0.061* -0.023 0.092 
(1.75) (-1.08) (1.83) (-1.24) (1.85) (-0.99) (1.64) 
Bank size (log) 5.009*** -5.250* 4.772*** -5.573* 4.841*** -5.468* 5.554*** 
(3.56) (-1.83) (3.39) (-1.96) (3.43) (-1.92) (3.08) 
Bank return on equity -0.559*** 0.753 -0.600*** 0.754 -0.599*** 0.742 -0.774*** 
(-3.10) (1.15) (-3.28) (1.16) (-3.28) (1.14) (-3.39) 
European bank dummy -25.900** -8.126 -25.272** -7.659 -25.064** -7.597 -15.068 
(-2.19) (-1.46) (-2.15) (-1.40) (-2.12) (-1.37) (-1.51) 
Borrower Firm Variables 
Firm size (log) -6.448*** -27.366*** -5.813*** -26.365*** -5.869*** -26.529*** -5.869*** 
(-4.43) (-4.42) (-4.07) (-4.26) (-4.10) (-4.29) (-2.66) 
Total debt 28.586 -7.406 26.221 -9.108 26.526 -9.361 5.348 
(1.46) (-0.32) (1.36) (-0.40) (1.38) (-0.41) (0.27) 
Short term debt 13.041 11.848 12.505 11.894 12.393 11.899 8.622 
(1.24) (1.05) (1.20) (1.06) (1.19) (1.06) (0.56) 
Tangibility -5.435 4.592 -5.636 3.058 -5.692 3.059 -3.686 
(-0.67) (0.12) (-0.70) (0.08) (-0.71) (0.08) (-0.29) 
R&D expenditures 81.153 -86.828 92.942 -76.011 91.760 -84.116 -36.276 
(0.96) (-0.36) (1.10) (-0.32) (1.09) (-0.35) (-0.34) 
Market-to-book -2.275** -1.839 -2.127* -1.667 -2.126* -1.672 1.758 
(-2.04) (-1.00) (-1.93) (-0.91) (-1.93) (-0.91) (1.26) 
Profitability -47.633** -46.675* -46.652** -48.132* -46.659** -48.149* 24.538 
(-2.55) (-1.66) (-2.51) (-1.72) (-2.51) (-1.72) (0.78) 
Interest coverage -0.460** -0.722*** -0.463** -0.729*** -0.459** -0.728*** -0.915*** 
(-2.44) (-3.03) (-2.46) (-3.05) (-2.44) (-3.05) (-3.96) 
Net working capital -5.126** -2.912 -5.374*** -2.927 -5.363*** -2.987 0.453 
(-2.49) (-0.89) (-2.65) (-0.90) (-2.64) (-0.92) (0.15) 
Stock volatility 118.390*** 109.746*** 114.855*** 108.492*** 114.584*** 108.232*** 128.029*** 
(10.43) (6.22) (10.02) (6.16) (10.02) (6.15) (6.09) 
Payout -1.958** -0.860 -1.893** -0.744 -1.919** -0.772 -3.934** 
(-2.09) (-0.59) (-2.03) (-0.51) (-2.06) (-0.53) (-2.50) 
Credit default swap spread 0.071*** 
(4.14) 
Borrower firm industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Borrower firm country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Borrower firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Bank country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 7,536 
R-squared 0.618 0.787 0.619 0.787 0.619 0.787 0.672 
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Table 8 
Loan Spread and Bank-Firm Governance Links: Subsamples 
This table presents results of regressions of loan spread on a bank-firm governance link through a board member or equity institutional holdings. The sample consists of syndicated 
loan facilities in DealScan for which we are able to obtain financial and market information on the borrower firm in Datastream/Worldscope. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) 
are excluded. The sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Columns (1) and (2) present results for firms with rating and firms without rating. Columns (3) and (4) present results for 
firms with credit default (CDS) spread above and below the yearly median. Columns (5) and (6) present results for loans where bank and firm are located in the same country and 
in different countries. Columns (7) and (8) present results for non-U.S. firms and U.S. firms. Columns (9) and (10) present results for loans made by banks that received a bailout 
and banks that have not received a bailout. Regressions include the same loan, bank and borrower firm variables (coefficients not shown) as in Table 7 and borrower firm industry 
fixed effects and borrower firm and bank country fixed effects. Regressions also include loan purpose and type dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 














Countries   
Non-U.S. 






Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy -0.999 20.517** 23.860*** 0.025 8.735** 12.737*** 13.077*** 9.254** 10.089** 6.786 
(-0.30) (2.49) (2.73) (0.01) (2.04) (2.67) (2.70) (2.01) (2.00) (1.37) 
Institutional holding link dummy 16.313*** 14.286** 20.995** -12.324* 23.250*** 11.176* 2.647 27.348*** 21.162*** 11.551* 
(3.17) (1.99) (2.23) (-1.91) (4.28) (1.65) (0.35) (4.75) (3.58) (1.78) 
Past loan relationship dummy 2.488 -3.031 3.628 3.291 4.530 0.171 -0.132 6.437** 0.477 3.801 
(1.05) (-0.71) (0.84) (1.19) (1.64) (0.06) (-0.04) (2.31) (0.18) (1.18) 
Same region dummy -1.914 -2.328 9.122* -11.709*** 1.611 1.995 -11.729 -1.764 -3.996 
(-0.62) (-0.47) (1.87) (-3.05) (0.33) (0.38) (-0.75) (-0.49) (-0.64) 
Financial Crisis Variables 
Crisis dummy 38.579*** 26.725** 37.922** 0.317 55.457*** 23.875*** 17.493** 56.810*** 42.195*** 23.577** 
(4.73) (2.14) (2.35) (0.04) (6.86) (2.59) (2.07) (6.19) (5.79) (2.52) 
Crisis dummy x -14.396 -30.581** -39.529** 2.634 -33.607*** -14.244 -7.076 -32.216** -33.904*** 2.934 
Board link dummy (-1.37) (-2.08) (-2.19) (0.29) (-2.75) (-1.14) (-0.59) (-2.38) (-2.93) (0.21) 
Crisis dummy x  -6.402 8.322 -58.412** 25.370* -9.809 -22.662 -28.870 -19.815* -6.173 -12.359 
Institutional holding link dummy (-0.56) (0.26) (-2.45) (1.87) (-0.70) (-1.35) (-1.34) (-1.67) (-0.46) (-0.75) 
Credit default swap spread 0.046*** 0.267*** 
(2.65) (3.19) 
Observations 9,747 7,434 3,658 3,878 5,261 11,920 10,436 6,745 9,426 7,755 
R-squared 0.672 0.606   0.668 0.595   0.632 0.631   0.646 0.585   0.617 0.630 
52
Table 9 
Loan Spread and Bank-Firm Governance Links: Instrumental Variables 
This table presents results of instrumental variables estimation using two-stage least squares (2SLS) that corrects for the 
endogeneity of bank-firm governance links through a board member or equity institutional holdings. The first stage is a logit 
regression predicting the existence of a bank-firm governance link, and the second stage is a regression where the dependent 
variable is the loan spread. The sample consists of syndicated loan facilities in DealScan for which we are able to obtain financial 
and market information on the borrower firm in Datastream/Worldscope. Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The 
sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Regressions include the same loan, bank and borrower firm variables (coefficients not 
shown) as in Table 7. Regressions also include loan purpose and type dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 















Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy 14.073** 10.809** 
(2.13) (2.05) 
Institutional holding link dummy 21.249** 16.717*** 
(2.46) (2.93) 
Past loan relationship dummy -0.408 0.604 1.860 2.201 
(-0.25) (0.35) (1.16) (1.36) 
Same region dummy 0.298 0.792 3.317* 1.736 
(0.17) (0.47) (1.83) (1.12) 
Financial Crisis Variables 
Crisis dummy 36.250*** 31.753*** 32.606*** 29.857*** 
(14.22) (11.76) (12.69) (11.05) 
Crisis dummy x  -16.215** -13.597** 
Board link dummy (-2.24) (-2.17) 
Crisis dummy x  3.519 -5.305 
Institutional holding link dummy (0.53) (-0.87) 
Instruments 
Mixing banking-commerce  -0.059*** 0.106*** 
regulation index (-3.70) (4.00) 
Bank publicly-listed dummy 0.161** 0.220** 
(2.09) (2.34) 
Borrower firm industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Borrower firm country fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Borrower firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Bank country fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Bank fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 16,349 16,349 16,349 16,296 16,296 16,296 
R-squared 0.15 0.61 0.79 0.19 0.59 0.78 
F-statistic of instruments 10.40 11.07 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen overidentification test 2.34 0.21 2.26 0.26 




Non-Pricing Loan Term and Bank-Firm Governance Links  
This table presents results of regressions of several non-pricing loan terms and loan syndicate concentration measures on a bank-
firm governance link through a board member or equity institutional holdings. The sample consists of syndicated loan facilities in 
DealScan for which we are able to obtain financial and market information on the borrower firm in Datastream/Worldscope. 
Financial borrowers (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. The sample period is from 2003 to 2008. Column (1) presents results of a 
probit regression of a dummy variable (secured) that takes the value of one if the loan is secured by collateral. Column (2) 
presents results of a probit regression of a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the loan terms include dividend 
restrictions. Columns (3)-(4) present results of OLS regressions of log of the loan maturity and loan amount (as a percentage of 
total assets). Columns (5)-(6) present results of OLS regressions log of the number of lenders and log of the number of lead 
arrangers. Regressions include the same loan, bank and borrower firm variables (coefficients not shown) as in Table 7 and 
borrower firm industry fixed effects and borrower firm and bank country fixed effects. Regressions also include loan purpose and 
type dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level and bank-level clustering 
are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy -0.027 -0.011 -0.009 0.048*** -0.076** -0.177*** 
(-0.21) (-0.10) (-0.32) (2.81) (-2.01) (-5.11) 
Institutional holding link dummy 0.032 0.067 -0.046** 0.039** -0.042 0.019 
(0.43) (0.84) (-1.98) (2.15) (-1.17) (0.64) 
Past loan relationship dummy 0.157*** -0.048 0.074*** 0.027** 0.023 -0.135*** 
(2.87) (-0.88) (4.34) (2.27) (0.94) (-6.77) 
Same region dummy 0.150*** 0.129** -0.006 -0.058*** -0.077*** -0.183*** 
(2.58) (2.40) (-0.41) (-2.76) (-3.13) (-7.43) 
Financial Crisis Variables 
Crisis dummy 0.151 0.219* 0.314*** 0.025 -0.515*** 0.206*** 
(1.09) (1.75) (6.35) (1.14) (-7.11) (4.00) 
Crisis dummy x  -0.074 -0.269 -0.088 -0.010 -0.212** 0.030 
Board link dummy (-0.24) (-0.64) (-1.24) (-0.29) (-2.11) (0.39) 
Crisis dummy x  0.031 -0.199 0.088 -0.009 -0.278** -0.099 
Institutional holding link dummy (0.13) (-0.89) (1.29) (-0.22) (-2.32) (-1.04) 
Observations 17,017 13,073 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 







Panel A: Loan Variables 
Loan dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank i acted as lead arranger in at least one loan facility to firm j over 2003-2008 (DealScan). 
Number of loans Number of loan facilities from bank i to firm j over 2003-2008 (DealScan). 
Volume of loans Volume of loan facilities in $ millions from bank i to firm j over 2003-2008 (DealScan). 
Share of loans Fraction that volume of loan facilities from bank i to firm j represent of all loans of firm j over 2003-2008 (DealScan).  
Loan spread Loan spread over LIBOR plus fees in the issue date in basis points (DealScan item All-in Spread Drawn). 
AAA-A rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senior bond rating of the firm at the close of the loan equals AAA or AA (DealScan). 
A rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senior bond rating of the firm at the close of the loan equals A (DealScan). 
BBB rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senior bond rating of the firm at the close of the loan equals BBB (DealScan). 
BB rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senior bond rating of the firm at the close of the loan equals BB (DealScan). 
B-C rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the senior bond rating of the firm at the close of the loan equals B, CCC, CC or C (DealScan). 
Loan amount Loan facility amount in $ millions (DealScan item Tranche Amount (Converted)). 
Secured dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is secured by collateral (DealScan item Secured). 
Maturity Loan maturity in years (DealScan item Tenor/Maturity). 
Dividend restriction dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan has restrictions on paying dividends (DealScan item Covenants: General-Material Restriction). 
Senior dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is senior (DealScan item Seniority). 
Guarantor dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan has a guarantor (DealScan item Borrower-Guarantor). 
Sponsor dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan has a sponsor (DealScan item Borrower-Sponsor). 
Number of lenders Number of lenders (DealScan item Number of Lenders). 
Number of arrangers Number of lead arrangers (DealScan). 
Syndicated loan dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is syndicated (DealScan item Distribution Method). 
Corporate purpose dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is for corporate purposes (DealScan item Primary Purpose). 
Refinance dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is to repay existing debt (DealScan item Primary Purpose). 
Takeover dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is to finance takeovers (DealScan item Primary Purpose). 
Working capital dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is for working capital purposes (DealScan item Primary Purpose). 
Credit line dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is a credit line (DealScan item Specific Tranche Type). 
Term loan dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is a term loan (DealScan item Specific Tranche Type). 
Bridge loan dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if loan is a bridge loan (DealScan item Specific Tranche Type). 
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Panel B: Bank-Firm Link Variables 
Board link dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is at least one common board member between the firm and the lead arranger bank (BoardEx). 
Institutional holding link 
dummy 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one institutional investor affiliated with the lead arranger bank has an equity position (of at 
least 1% of shares outstanding) in the firm (LionShares). 
Insider stake link dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the lead arranger bank has an equity stake of at least 1% of shares outstanding in the firm 
(LionShares). 
Past loan relationship dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a loan between the lead arranger bank and the firm over 1998-2002 (DealScan). 
Same region dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the lead arranger bank and the firm are located in the same geographic region (DealScan). 
Panel C: Bank Variables 
Bank ranking Rank of lead arranger bank in the top 500 The Banker rankings in 2005 (The Banker). 
Bank size Market value of equity (book value in the case of non-publicly listed banks) in $ millions of the lead arranger bank (Bankscope). 
Bank return on equity Return on equity of the lead arranger bank (Bankscope). 
European bank dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if lead arranger bank is headquartered in Europe (DealScan). 
Bank publicly-listed dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank is publicly listed (Worldscope). 
Panel D: Borrower Firm Variables 
Firm size Sales in $ millions (Worldscope item 01001). 
Total debt Total debt divided by total assets (Worldscope item 03255 / item 02999). 
Short term debt Short-term debt divided by total debt (Worldscope item 03051 / item 03255). 
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02501 / item 02999). 
R&D expenditures R&D expenditures divided by total assets (Worldscope item 01201 / item 02999). 
Market-to-book Market value of equity divided by book value of equity (Worldscope item 08001 / item 03501). 
Profitability Net income before extraordinary items divided by sales (Worldscope item 01551 / item 01001). 
Interest coverage EBITDA divided by interest expenses (Worldscope item 18198 / item 01251). 
Net working capital Current assets minus liabilities to total debt ((Worldscope item 02201 – item 03101 + item 03051) / item 03255). 
Stock volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (Datastream). 
Payout Common dividends plus stock repurchases divided by operating income ((Worldscope item 05376 + item 03499) / item 01250). 
Credit default swap spread Five-year senior credit default swap spreads (Datastream/Credit Market Analysis). 
Panel E: Other Variables 
Mixing banking-commerce         
regulation index 
Index of the degree of regulatory restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and commerce that measures restrictions on the ability of banks to own 
and control nonfinancial firms and the ability of nonfinancial firms to own and control banks (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004).  
Crisis dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the loan issue date is between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008. 
 
